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TAXATION

-

MEALS

AND

LODGING

FURNISHED

FOR

EM-

PLOYER'S CONVENIENCE ARE NOT WAGES FOR PURPOSES OF
FEDERAL INSURANCE CONTRIBUTIONS ACT, FEDERAL UNEMPLOYMENT

TAX

ACT,

AND

FEDERAL

WITHHOLDING

TAX.

Rowan Companies, Inc. v. United States, 101 S.Ct. 2288 (1981).

In Rowan Companies, Inc. v. United States,' a divided 2 United
States Supreme Court held that the value of meals and lodging furnished to employees for the convenience of the employer did not
constitute "wages ' 3 for the purpose of taxation under the Federal
Insurance Contributions Act (FICA),4 the Federal Unemployment
Tax Act (FUTA),5 and the federal w:ithholding tax.6 The Court's
conclusion was based upon a determination that Congress intended
the statutory definitions of wages7 to be interpreted in the same manner for FICA and FUTA as for income tax withholding. By narrowing the scope of the term "wages" and by interpreting the statutes
consistently, the Supreme Court has taken a significant step toward
achieving the congressional goal of a coordinated tax system.8
Rowan Companies, Inc., owned a number of land based and
offshore oil and gas drilling rigs. Several of the offshore rigs were
located sixty miles from shore. Because of the time and cost required for transportation,9 Rowan kept two crews at the rigs at all
1. 101 S.Ct. 2288 (1981).
2. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice White filed a dissenting
opinion in which Justices Brennan and Marshall joined.
3. Wages are payments from an employer to an employee that are received as a quid
pro quo for particular services performed by the employee for the employer. Royster Co. v.
United States, 479 F.2d 387, 402 (4th Cir. 1973). The compensation may be in the form of
money paid or other consideration given, such as board, lodging, or clothes. Pacific Am. Fisheries v. United States, 138 F.2d 464, 468 (9th Cir. 1943).
4. IR.C. §§ 3101-3126.
5. I.R.C. §§ 3301-3311.
6. For purposes of this Note, I.R.C. §§ 3401-3404 will be referred to as the federal withholding tax.
7. Congress defined wages identically in FICA and FUTA as "all remuneration for
employment, including the cash value of all remuneration paid in any medium other than
cash." I.R.C. § 3121(a) (FICA); I.R.C. § 3306(b) (FUTA). Congress used substantially identical language for the purpose of the federal withholding tax, defining wages as "all remuneration (other than fees paid to a public official) for services performed by an employee for his
employer, including the cash value of all remuneration paid in any medium other than cash."
I.R.C. § 3401(a).
8. See notes 71-74 and accompanying text infra.
9. It took approximately two hours to transport a crew to and from the rig. Rowan's
cost for this transportation would have been $275-$350 per day for each crew, or approximately $25 per person, per day. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 4, Rowan Cos., Inc. v.
United States, 101 S. Ct. 2288 (1981).

times, each crew working a twelve hour shift for ten consecutive
days.' 0 While on the rigs, lodging and three meals a day
were pro2
vided for members of the crews" at Rowan's expense.'
For a period of three years, Rowan failed to include the value of
meals and lodging in computing employees' wages' 3 for federal
withholding tax purposes.' 4 Furthermore, Rowan did not include
the value in its computation of wages for the purpose of determining
tax obligations under FICA and FUTA.' 5 Upon audit, the Internal
Revenue Service determined that Rowan had properly excluded the
value in calculating wages under the withholding tax. Nevertheless,
the Service assessed a deficiency against Rowan on the ground that
the fair market value of meals and lodging should have been added
to the tax base for FICA and FUTA.' 6 Rowan paid the additional
assessment' 7 and sued for a refund.
The district court granted the Government's motion for sum-

mary judgment 8 and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.' 9 The circuit court based its decision on the interpretation of
the term "wages" adopted by current treasury regulations. 20 These
10. Id at 3. At the end of the ten day work period, Rowan would transport one of the
crews ashore for a five day period of leave and would bring a new crew to the rig. Id
11. All crew members received the same meals and lodging irrespective of pay scale or
employment status. In addition, employees received no cash allowance if they chose not to eat
a meal. Moreover, Rowan did not provide meals or lodging to employees on leave or to crews
on land based rigs. 101 S. Ct. at 2290.
12. It cost Rowan only six dollars per day, per person to hire a caterer to provide the
meals and to maintain the living quarters. Id at 2290 n.I.
13. The sole basis of an employer's tax obligation under FICA, FUTA, and the federal
withholding tax is the amount of wages paid for employment. Hotel Conquistador, Inc. v.
United States, 597 F.2d 1348, 1351 (Ct. Cl. 1979). See Humble Pipe Line Co. v. United States,
442 F.2d 1353, 1356 (Ct. Cl. 1971) (per curiam); Personal Finance Co. of Braddock v. United
States, 86 F. Supp. 779, 786 (D. Del. 1949).
14. I.R.C. § 3402 provides, in pertinent part,
(a) Requirement of Withholding. - Except as otherwise provided in this section, every
employer making payment of wages shall deduct and withhold upon such wages a
tax determined in accordance with tables prescribed by the Secretary.
I.R.C. § 3402(a).
15. 101 S. Ct. at 2291.
16. Id The Internal Revenue Service based the determination on the different interpretations given to the term "wages" by the present treasury regulations. See note 20 infra.
17. The additional assessment totaled $35,198.46, plus interest. 101 S. Ct. 2290 n.6.
18. Id at 2291. The order of the district court was issued without opinion and was not
reported. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 1.
19. Rowan Cos., Inc. v. United States, 624 F.2d 701 (5th Cir. 1980).
20. Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(a)-I (1956) (FICA) states,
(0 Ordinarily, facilities or privileges. . . furnished or offered by an employer to
his employee generally, are not considered as remuneration for employment if such
facilities or privileges are of relatively small value and are offered or furnished by the
employer merely as a means of promoting the health, good will, contentment, or
efficiency of his employees. The term "facilities or privileges," however does not
ordinarily include the value of meals or lodging furnished, for example, to restaurant
or hotel employees, or to seamen or other employees aboard vessels, since generally
these items constitute an appreciable part of the total remuneration of such employee.
Treas. Reg. § 31.3306(b)-I(f) (1956) defines wages under FUTA in identical language.
Treas. Reg. § 31.3401(a)-I (1956) provides,
(b) Certain spec#fc itens - (9) Value of meals and lodging. The value of meals and

regulations exclude meals and lodging from wages under the withholding tax if they are furnished for the convenience of the employer 2' and under FICA and FUTA if the value does not amount to

an appreciable part of an employee's remuneration for services.22
Although the circuit court noted that the definition of wages was
substantially identical under the three statutes, the court reasoned
that the Treasury's interpretations of the term were justified by the
different purposes of FICA and FUTA, in relation to the federal

withholding tax. 23 Because the holding conflicted with decisions of
other courts of appeals,2 4 the Supreme Court granted certiorari.2 5 In
reversing the circuit court, the Rowan Court maintained that the

value of meals and lodging provided to employees for the employer's
convenience should be excluded from wages for purposes of taxation
under FICA and FUTA.
When Congress enacted FICA, FUTA, 26 and the federal withholding tax, 27 it selected wages as the base for measuring an emlodging furnished to an employee by his employer is not subject to withholding if the
value of the meals or lodging is excludable from the gross income of the employee.
21. I.R.C. § 119 provides that an employee may exclude the value of meals and lodging
furnished to him for the convenience of his employer. See note 42 infra. Under Treas. Reg.
§ 31.3306(b)-l(f), § 119 becomes relevant in determining whether meals and lodging should be
included as wages for withholding purposes.
22. See note 20 supra.
23. Rowan Cos., Inc. v. United States, 624 F.2d 701, 706 (5th Cir. 1980). Congress enacted FICA and FUTA to provide for the general welfare through the establishment of a
provident fund for needy workers through a system of taxation. Hearst Publications, Inc. v.
United States, 70 F. Supp. 666, 670 (N.D. Cal. 1946), af'd, 168 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1948); see
Fahs v. Tree-Gold Coop. Growers, 166 F.2d 40, 44 (5th Cir. 1948). More specifically, FICA
was designed to provide old age, survivors, disability, and hospital benefits. Royster Co. v.
United States, 479 F.2d 387, 389 (4th Cir. 1973). Accord, United States v. Vogue, 145 F.2d
609, 611 (4th Cir. 1944); see Stone v. United States, 55 F. Supp. 230, 233 (E.D. Pa. 1943).
FUTA was intended to provide funds for periods of economic stress when workers, through no
fault of their own, were unable to find employment. FUTA was enacted to take care of individuals whose enforced lack of employment resulted in financial loss and whose personal resources were insufficient to maintain a proper standard of living. Personal Finance Co. v.
United States, 86 F. Supp. 779, 786 (D. Del. 1949).
The federal withholding tax system, on the other hand, was designed by Congress to collect, on a current basis, the income tax to which an employee's income would eventually be
subjected. To achieve this objective in the least burdensome manner, Congress adopted a
system that placed an employee's income tax liability on an installment or "pay-as-you-go"
basis. Under this system, an amount of tax was periodically withheld from an employee's
wages. This amount would act as a tax credit for the employee when he filed his income tax
return. Thus, the "pay-as-you-go" system alleviated the taxpayer's burden of making a large,
lump-sum payment at one time and also served to guard the Treasury against deaths, disappearances, and insolvencies. People's Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 373 F.2d 924, 933 (Ct. Cl.
1967); 8 A.J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 47A.01 (rev. 1971); Note,
Withholding Tax on Wages. CentralIllinois Public Service Co. v. UnitedStates, 29 MAINE L.
REV. 401, 403-04 (1978).
24. See Oscar Mayer & Co. v. United States, 623 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1980); Royster Co.
v. United States, 479 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1973).
25. Rowan Cos., Inc. v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 917 (1981).
26. The predecessor provisions of FICA and FUTA were enacted as Titles VIII and IX
of the Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620, 636, 639. They were later codified in
the INT. REV. CODE of 1939, ch. 9, §§ 1410, 1520, 53 Stat. 175, 180, and finally in the 1954
Code, I.R.C. §§ 3101-3121 & 3306-3311.
27. The present withholding system originated in the Victory Tax imposed by the Reve-

ployer's tax obligation. Despite the apparent simplicity of the term,

the process of defining wages 28 has generated a profusion of conflicting interpretations. Litigation has centered not only on the scope of
29
the term "wages," but also on the meaning of meals and lodging

and on the proper standard to apply in determining whether meals
and lodging should be excluded from the calculation of wages.3 °
The Supreme Court has recently attempted to clarify this area
of the tax law. In Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. United
States,3 the Court distinguished the concepts of wages and income

by holding that the terms were not identical for purposes of the tax
laws.3 2 The Court rejected the Government's contention that income
and wages were of equivalent scope since the definition of wages
under the withholding statute corresponded to the first category of
gross income set forth in the Internal Revenue Code.3 3 Instead, the
Court held that the mere fact that reimbursements were made in the
context of the employer-employee relationship did not govern the
withholding tax result. 34 Furthermore, the Court noted that alnue Act of 1942, ch. 619, 56 Stat. 884. The Victory Tax was replaced by the Current Tax
Payment Act of 1943, ch. 120, 57 Stat. 126. The structure of this Act was codified in the 1954
Code, I.R.C. §§ 3401-3404.
28. The term "wages" has been defined narrowly by a number of courts to exclude the
value of specified benefits. See, e.g., Central Illinois Pub. Serv. Co. v. United States, 435 U.S.
21 (1978) (lunch reimbursements); Oscar Mayer & Co. v. United States, 623 F.2d 1223 (7th
Cir. 1980) (reimbursement for expenses incurred inoperating company cars); Royster Co. v.
United States, 479 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1973) (cash reimbursements for meals); Stubbs, Overbeck
& Assocs. v. United States, 445 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1971) (per diem payments as living allowance to employees working out of state); Acacia Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 272 F.
Supp. 188 (D. Md. 1967) (expenses of annual convention); Hotel Conquistador, Inc. v. United
States, 597 F.2d 1348 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (meals provided without charge); Humble Oil & Ref. Co.
v. United States, 442 F.2d 1362 (Ct. Cl. 1971) (per curiam) (payment of direct and indirect
moving expenses); Humble Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 442 F.2d 1353 (Ct. Cl. 1971) (per
curiam) (payment of moving costs); People's Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 373 F.2d 924 (Ct.
Cl. 1967) (all-expense paid trip to annual convention).
Other courts have defined the term "wages" broadly to include the value of certain benefits. See, e.g., S.S. Kresge Co. v. United States, 379 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1967) (meals furnished
to lunch stand employees); Pacific Am. Fisheries v. United States, 138 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1943)
(meals and lodging); Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 1314
(E.D.N.C. 1977) (residence); Campbell Sash Works, Inc. v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 74
(N.D. Ohio 1963) (all-expenses paid trip to Florida).
29. See notes 40-45 and accompanying text inffra.
30. See notes 48-53 and accompanying text infra.
31. 435 U.S. 21 (1978).
32. [d at 25. A number of other courts have distinguished the terms "wages" and "income." See, e.g., Oscar Mayer & Co. v. United States, 623 F.2d 1223, 1225 (7th Cir. 1980);
Royster Co. v. United States, 479 F.2d 387, 390 (4th Cir. 1973); Stubbs, Overbeck & Assocs. v.
United States, 445 F.2d 1142, 1149 (5th Cir. 1971); Humble Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 442
F.2d 1353, 1356 (Ct. Cl. 1971) (per curiam).
33. I.R.C. § 61 provides, in pertinent part,
(a) General Definitions. - Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross income
means all income from whatever source derived, including (but not limited to) the
following items: (1) Compensation for services, including fees, commissions, and
similar items.
34. 435 U.S. at 29. The Government's theory that income and wages are of equivalent
scope is too broad. Carried to its logical conclusion, this assumption might require that every
payment or other economic gain flowing from an employer to an employee would constitute

though "wages usually are income, . . . many items qualify as income and yet clearly are not wages."3 5 Under this approach, an
employer could exclude meal reimbursements in computing wages
even though the reimbursements constituted income to the employee.36 Thus, the Court's decision restricted the scope of the term

"wages" by declaring that wages was a narrower concept than

income.37
Nevertheless, the CentralIllinois holding was of limited utility
because the Court failed to establish standards whereby an employer
could determine whether benefits given to his employees fell within
this narrowed interpretation of wages.38 Consequently, discretion
was left to the courts in determining which benefits to include in
wages, a situation that caused constant change in the scope of the
term "wages." 39
The Supreme Court was more successful in clarifying the meaning of "meals and lodging," a phrase that had previously been interpreted by the circuit courts' to include cash reimbursements for
meals. In Commissioner v. Kowalski,4" the Court rejected these interpretations. The Court examined the plain language of section 119 of
the Internal Revenue Code,4 2 which excluded from an employee's
gross income meals and lodging furnished by his employer, and then
noted that section 119 made no provision for cash reimbursements.
Furthermore, the omission was not a congressional oversight since
the Senate had expressly stated that section 119 was to apply "only
wages upon which FICA, FUTA, and withholding taxes are payable. See Royster Co. v.
United States, 479 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1973).
For instances in which benefits from employer to employee did not constitute wages, see
Rev. Rul. 227, 1959-2 C.B. 13 (amount received by railroad employee as consideration for
relinquishing all seniority rights was income to employee but did not constitute wages); Rev.
Rul. 520, 1955-2 C.B. 393 (amount paid employee as compromise settlement for cancellation
of an employment contract did not constitute wages although the amount was includable in
gross income).
35. 435 U.S. at 25. The Court in CentralIllinois listed interest, rent, and dividends as
examples of items that constituted income but not wages. Id
36. Id at 21-25.
37. Id at 29.
38. For a more complete discussion of Central Illinois, see Note, Withholding Tax On
Wages. CentralIllinois Public Service Co. v. United States, 29 MAINE L. REv. 401 (1978).
39. See note 28 supra
40. See, e.g., Royster Co. v. United States, 479 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1973); Stubbs,
Ove-beck & Assocs. v. United States, 445 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Morelan,
356 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1966). See also Rev. Rul. 386, 1940-1 C.B. 210.
41. 434 U.S. 77 (1977).
42. I.R.C. § 119 provides,
There shall be excluded from gross income of an employee the value of any
meals or lodging furnished to him by his employer for the convenience of the employer, but only if (1) in the case of meals, the meals are furnished on the business premises of the
employer, or
(2) in the case of lodging, the employee is required to accept such lodging on the
business premises of his employer as a condition of his employment.

to meals and lodging furnished in kind",4 3 Accordingly, the Court
ruled that cash reimbursements for meals were not subject to exclusion under section 119." Kowalski thus significantly restricted the
meaning of "meals and lodging" and dispelled confusion on the issue of whether cash reimbursements constituted income to the
recipients.45
The Supreme Court's decision in Rowan is consistent with Central Illinois and Kowalski in its attempt to clarify tax law in the area
of meals and lodging. The Rowan Court addressed the issue of the
proper standard for an employer to apply in determining whether
meals and lodging should be considered wages.4 6 Consequently, the
Court provided guidelines for consistent interpretations of wages
under FICA, FUTA, and the federal withholding tax.
The confusion over the applicable standard was created by the
issuance of conflicting treasury regulations interpreting the statutory
definition of wages under FICA and FUTA. 47 The Commissioner of
Internal Revenue had issued regulations contemporaneously with
the Social Security Act. 48 These regulations provided that an employer who furnished "facilities or privileges"4 9 to employees for the
employer's own convenience could exclude their value in calculating
wages for FICA and FUTA purposes.5 0 Four years later, however,
the Commissioner issued new regulations5 that excluded the "convenience-of-the-employer" 5 2 rule from the computation of wages.
Nevertheless, the courts and the Internal Revenue Service continued
43. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 190 (1954) (emphasis added). See also Treas.
Reg. § 1.119-1(c)(2) (1977).
44. 434 U.S. at 84.
45. The Supreme Court's decision in CentralIllinois is consistent with Kowalski. The
Court in CentralIllinois held that lunch reimbursements provided to the employer's traveling
salesmen were not wages for withholding purposes. The decision was based on Treas. Reg.
§ 31.3401(a)-l(b)(2) (1956), which excluded from wages amounts paid for traveling or other
necessary business expenses. Consequently, the Court failed to reach the issue of whether the
reimbursements were wages under I.R.C. § 119.
46. 101 S. Ct. 2288 (1981).
47. See note 79 and accompanying text infra.
48. Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620.
49. The term "facilities or privileges" was defined to include, inter alia, entertainment,
cafeterias, restaurants, medical services, and courtesy discounts or purchases. Treas. Reg. 90,
art. 207 (1936); Treas. Reg. 91, art. 14 (1936).
50. Treasury Regulation 91 was substantially identical to Treasury Regulation 90 except
that the phrase "convenience-of-the-employer" was not contained in Treasury Regulation 91.
Nevertheless, Treasury Regulation 91 was interpreted consistently with Treasury Regulation
90 to include the rule. See Rev. Rul. 383, 1940-1 C.B. 210; Rev. Rul. 302, 1938-1 C.B. 456.
51. Treas. Reg. 106, § 402.227 (1940); Treas. Reg. 907, § 403.227.
52. The phrase "convenience-of-the-employer" first appeared when the Treasury ruled
that "board and lodging furnished seamen... [was] held to be supplied for the convenience
of the employer" and therefore the value was not to be reported in the employees' income tax
returns. Rev. Rul. 265, 1 C.B. 71 (1919). Thereafter, the convenience-of-the-employer rule
was followed consistently in determining an employee's taxable income. Rowan Cos., Inc. v.
United States, 624 F.2d 701, 705 (5th Cir. 1980). The rule, with certain limitations, was codified in I.R.C. § 119. See note 42 supra.

to apply the rule for the next twenty years.53
In contrast to the confusion surrounding FICA and FUTA, the
history of the federal withholding tax provisions has been quite consistent. The treasury regulations issued pursuant to the Current Tax
Payments Act 54 explicitly provided for the application of the conven-

ience-of-the-employer rule in the determination of wages. The current withholding regulation, issued pursuant to the 1954 Internal
Revenue Code,15 omitted this phrase. Instead, the regulation provided that "the value of meals and lodging furnished to an employee
by his employer [was] not subject to withholding if the value . ..
[was] excludable from the gross income of the employee."56 Since an
employee may exclude the value of meals and lodging furnished to
him for the convenience of his employer,57 the regulation effectively
incorporates the convenience-of-the-employer rule. Consequently,
litigation in this area has not centered on the determination of the
applicable standard, but rather on the interpretation of section 119.58

The Rowan decision reconciled the conflicting Treasury interpretations of wages under FICA, FUTA, and the federal withhold53. See note 79 and accompanying text infra.
54. Ch. 120, 57 Stat. 126.
55. I.R.C. § 3401-04.
56. Treas. Reg. § 31.3401(a)-l(b)(9) (1956).
57. I.R.C. § 119.
58. The conflict has centered on three questions: (I) What elements are to be considered
in determining whether a benefit has been conferred for the convenience of the employer?
(2) What is meant by "on the business premises"? and (3) What is meant by "as a condition of
employment"? See note 42 supra.
In determining whether an employer has furnished meals or lodging for his own benefit,
courts have taken into account the following: the availability of nearby facilities, Commissioner v. Kowalski, 343 U.S. 77 (1977); the minimization of time needed for meals, Hotel
Conquistador, Inc. v. United States, 597 F.2d 1348 (Ct. CI. 1979); and the availability of employees to perform services, S.S. Kresge Co. v. United States, 379 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1967);
Boykin v. Commissioner, 260 F.2d 249 (8th Cir. 1958); Rev. Rul. 235, 1970-1 C.B. 193.
"Business premises" has been defined as the premises where a significant portion of the
employee's duties were performed or where the employer conducted a significant portion of his
business. Commissioner v. Anderson, 371 F.2d 59, 64 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 906
(1966); See Lindeman v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 609 (1973).
Despite the apparent simplicity of the definition of business premises courts continue to
reach conflicting results. Compare United States v. Morelan, 356 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1966)
(state trooper's receipt of subsistence allowance as reimbursement for meals purchased in restaurant adjacent to public highway was not gross income because the business premises of the
State of Minnesota extended throughout the state) with Wilson v. United States, 412 F.2d 694
(1st Cir. 1969) (state trooper's receipt of allowance as reimbursement for meals purchased in
restaurant adjacent to public highway was gross income because the state conducted no business in the restaurant nor did the trooper perform a significant part of his duties there). See
also Benninghoff v. Commissioner, 614 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1980).
"Condition of employment" does not mean that the employee was compelled to accept
the lodging as a condition precedent to securing or retaining employment. Rather, the term
relates to a practical working necessity for the proper performance of the employee's duties
either because the employee could not perform the services unless he was furnished with such
lodging or because he was required to be available for duty at all times. Coyner v. Bingler, 344
F.2d 736 (3d Cir. 1965) (building caretaker required to live on premises). Accord, United
States Junior Chamber of Commerce v. United States, 334 F.2d 660 (Ct. Cl. 1964) (president
of organization required to reside in official headquarters).

ing tax. The Supreme Court began its analysis by adopting the
premise that Rowan had properly excluded the value of meals and
lodging in computing wages for federal withholding tax purposes.5 9
Basing the holding on the convenience-of-the-employer rule,6" the
Court concluded that Rowan's employees could exclude the value of
meals and lodging from their gross income because Rowan furnished the meals and lodging on the business premises for Rowan's
convenience. Moreover, employees were required to accept the
lodging as a condition of employment.6 Therefore, under current
this amount from wages
treasury regulations, Rowan could exclude
62

for federal withholding tax purposes.

In addition, the Rowan Court concluded that meals and lodging
should have been excluded from wages for FICA and FUTA taxation purposes. 63 In reaching this decision, the Court concluded that
Congress had intended the definition of wages to be interpreted consistently under the three statutes. 64 Consequently, the Court invalidated the treasury regulations that included meals and lodging in

wages65 on the basis that they were not in harmony with congressional intent.6 6

59. 101 S. Ct. at 2291. The Supreme Court's position followed from the reasoning in
Central Illinois that wages is a narrower concept than income for the purposes of the federal
withholding tax. See notes 34-39 and accompanying text supra.
60. See note 52 and accompanying text supra.
61. 101 S. Ct. at 2291. Rowan's provision of meals and lodging fulfilled each of the
requirements of I.R.C. § 119. See note 42 supra.
62. The Government also conceded that under I.R.C. § 119 and Treas. Reg. 31.3401(a)l(b)(9) (1956), Rowan correctly excluded the value of the meals and lodging in calculating
wages for federal withholding tax purposes. 101 S. Ct. at 2291.
63. 101 S. Ct. at 2297. The first court to hold that wages should be interpreted consistently under the FICA, FUTA, and withholding acts was Royster Co. v. United States, 479
F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1973). The Royster court concluded that slight variations in the wording of
the FICA, FUTA, and withholding statutes were inconsequential; thus wages had the same
essential meaning under all three Acts. Notably, the government agreed with this determination. Id at 390. For a thorough discussion of Royster, see Note, TAXATION-Employer Reimbursements Not Subject to F. CA., F U.TA., And Income Tax Withholding, 10 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 651 (1974).
Recently, courts have adopted the Royster position. See Oscar Mayer & Co. v. United
States, 623 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1980). See also Central Illinois Pub. Serv. Co. v. United States,
435 U.S. 21 (1978); Hotel Conquistador, Inc. v. United States, 597 F.2d 1348 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
See generally Campbell Sash Works, Inc. v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 74 (N.D. Ohio 1963).
In contradistinction, other courts have held that payments were not wages for withholding but
were for FICA and FUTA. See S.S. Kresge Co. v. United States, 379 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1967);
Pacific Am. Fisheries v. United States, 138 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1943); S.S. Kresge, 218 F. Supp.
240 (E.D. Mich. 1963). See also Rev. Rul. 5657, 1944 C.B. 550.
64. 101 S. Ct. at 2297.
65. Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(a)-1(f) (1956) and Treas. Reg. § 31.3306(b)-l(f) (1956). See
note 20 supra. These treasury regulations were criticized by the court in Hotel Conquistador
Inc. v. United States, 597 F.2d 1348 (Ct. Cl. 1979). The court noted that the regulations recognize that not all food and lodging benefits are remuneration. The regulations state, however,
that "ordinarily" and "generally" such benefits are wages, because "generally" they constitute
an appreciable part of total remuneration. Under this definition, there is no way to determine
whether an employer's plan is an ordinary or general case, except that the language seems to
intimate that the regulations consider rather massive benefits as "general" remuneration. Id
66. 101 S. Ct. at 2297. Courts are not bound by treasury regulations that are unreasona-

In order to determine congressional intent, the Court reviewed
the plain language and legislative histories of the FICA, FUTA, and
federal withholding tax statutes.6 7 Initially, the Supreme Court
noted that Congress had defined wages in substantially identical language in each act. 68 This "sequence of consistency" 69 provided
strong evidence that Congress intended the term to be interpreted in
the same manner for all three acts.7 °
Furthermore, the legislative histories of the statute supported
the Court's conclusion. The 1942 Senate reports7 on withholding
revealed that Congress based withholding on the same measure as
taxation under FICA and FUTA in order to promote simplicity and
ease of administration in the tax system. 72 Later, when Congress enacted the Current Tax Payment Act of 1943, the Senate declared that
"the methods of collection, payment, and administration of the withholding tax have been coordinated generally with those applicable to
the Social Security Tax."' 73 The Rowan Court reasoned that contradictory interpretations of substantially identical definitions would
not serve the congressional intent.7 4
Additionally, the Court applied the convenience-of-the-employer rule to FICA and FUTA. The congressional committee reports discussing the Social Security Act stated that wages included
not only cash payments for services rendered, but also compensation
in other forms, such as room and board.75 The Court held, however,
that such a statement did not necessarily mean that Congress intended to tax remuneration in kind without regard for principles developed under income taxation, such as the convenience-of-theemployer rule. 76 This conclusion was supported by a lack of evidence in the committee reports to indicate that Congress intended to
exclude this well-established rule from computations under the Social Security Act or that Congress intended to create a different rule
to govern room and board.7 7
The majority opinion then focused on the history of the treasury
ble or plainly inconsistent with the revenue statute that they seek to implement. Commissioner
v. Anderson, 371 F.2d 59, 64 (6th Cir. 1966).
67. 101 S. Ct. at 2293-95.
68. See note 7 supra.
69. 101 S. Ct. at 2293.
70. Id
71. S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 165 (1942).
72. Id See Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 21, 31 (1978).
73. S. REP. No. 221, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1943). In addition, the Senate reiterated
that its purpose in coordinating the tax systems was to "facilitate the work of both the Government and the employer in administering the withholding system." Id
74.
75.
1st Sess.
76.
77.

101 S. Ct. at 2294.
H.R. REP. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 32, 36 (1935); S. REP. No. 628, 74th Cong.,
44, 49 (1935).
101 S. Ct. at 2295.
Id

regulations interpreting the statutory definition of wages in FICA
and FUTA. Justice Powell, writing for the majority, acknowledged
that the current treasury regulations made no provision for the convenience-of-the-employer rule, but did not find that this omission
disposed of the issue.7 8 Justice Powell noted that the Internal Revenue Service did not fully reject the convenience-of-the-employer rule
until 1962, even though regulations omitting the rule had been in
effect since 1940." 9 Relying on this fact, the Court dismissed the
Government's contention that the 1936 Treasury Regulations were
inconsequential and that the 1940 Regulations acquired "the effect
of law" when Congress, in 1954, reenacted FICA and FUTA without
substantial change. 80 According to the Court, this history afforded
only the most tenuous support to the view that Congress intended to
approve different interpretations of the term "wages" when it reenacted the Code in 1954.81
Consequently, the Rowan Court concluded that the current
treasury regulations were inconsistent with the plain language and
legislative histories of the acts, which indicated that Congress intended the term "wages" to be defined in the same manner for
FICA, FUTA, and federal withholding tax purposes. 82 Moreover,
the regulations implemented the statutory definition of wages in an
unreasonable manner.83 Therefore, the Court invalidated the regulations84 and, in effect, reinstituted the convenience-of-the-employer
test for FICA and FUTA.
. The Supreme Court decision in Rowan is of significance not
only to the employer, but also to the government. From the employer's viewpoint, uniform guidelines now exist to determine
whether the meals and lodging furnished to employees will subject
the employer to increased tax liability. Furthermore, employer liability under FICA, FUTA, and the federal withholding tax will no
longer depend on the geographic location of the employer's busi78. Id at 2296.
79. Treas. Reg. 90, art. 207 (1936) and Treas. Reg. 91, art. 14 (1936) contained the convenience-of-the-employer rule. Pursuant to these regulations, the Treasury issued Rev. Rul.
302, 1938-1 C.B. 456, which excluded from wages the value of meals provided for the convenience of the employer. In 1940, the Treasury issued Treas. Reg. 106, § 402.227 and Treas. Reg.
107, § 403.227. Significantly, these regulations failed to provide for the convenience-of-theemployer rule. Furthermore, Rev. Rul. 5657, 1944 C.B. 550, provided that meals and lodging
were wages whether or not they were furnished for the convenience-of-the-employer. Nevertheless, in 1957, the Internal Revenue Service explained that, although Rev. Rul. 302 did not
apply to the furnishing of meals to restaurant employees, it was otherwise in "full force and
effect." Rev. Rul. 471, 1957-2 C.B. 630, 632. Rev. Rul. 302 was not fully rejected until 1962,
when the Treasury specifically stated that the convenience-of-the-employer rule no longer applied to federal unemployment taxes. Rev. Rul. 150, 1962-2 C.B. 213.
80. 101 S. Ct. at 2296.
81. Id at 2297.
82. Id
83. Id

84. Id

ness.85 From the government's point of view, Rowan represents a
significant step toward integration of the federal tax system. The
decision has provided a uniform standard for determining the excludability of meals and lodging from wages under FICA, FUTA,
and the federal withholding tax. Furthermore, by incorporating the
convenience-of-the-employer rule as the applicable standard, Rowan
has conditioned an employer's determination of tax obligations upon
his employee's federal income tax liability. Thus, after a forty year
wait, progress has finally been made toward the congressional goal
of a simplified, coordinated tax system.

85. Since the convenience-of-the-employer standard is now applicable under all three
statutes, an employer will no longer be subject to tax liability in this instance solely on the
basis of location in a particular circuit. Nevertheless, an employer must still contend with the
variety of interpretations given by the courts to the different provisions of I.R.C. § 119. See
note 58 supra. For a discussion of the economic effects on the employer, see Note, Are Nondeductible Meal Allowances Wages Subject to Withholding,

(1977).
[Casenote by Diane R. Neff.]
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

-

FIRST AMENDMENT -

MUNICIPALI-

TIES MAY NOT EXCLUDE LIVE ENTERTAINMENT FROM AREAS

ZONED FOR COMMERCIAL USES. Schad v. Borough of Mount

Ephraim, 101 S. Ct. 2176 (1981).

In Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim,' a divided2 United
States Supreme Court determined that imposition of criminal sanctions for violation of a zoning ordinance3 that proscribed all live entertainment within a commercial zone contravened the United States
Constitution.' The zoning ordinance was invalidated because it violated rights of free expression 5 guaranteed by the first 6 and fourteenth 7 amendments of the Constitution. Accordingly, the Court
held that the Borough of Mount Ephraim had failed to demonstrate
"sufficient justification for the exclusion of a broad category of pro1. 101 S. Ct. 2176 (1981).
2. Justice White authored the majority opinion. Justice Blackmun wrote a separate
concurrence and Justice Powell, joined by Justice Stewart, also concurred separately. Justice
Stevens concurred in the judgment. Justice Rehnquist joined Chief Justice Burger's dissent.
3. The Mount Ephraim zoning ordinance provided,
B. Principal permitted uses on the land and in buildings.
(1) Offices and banks; taverns; restaurants and luncheonettes for sit-down dinners only and with no drive-in facilities; automobile sales; retail stores, such as but not
limited to food, wearing apparel, millinery, fabrics, hardware, lumber, jewelry, paint,
wallpaper, appliances, flowers, gifts, books, stationery, pharmacy, liquors, cleaners,
novelties, hobbies and toys; repair shops for shoes, jewels, clothes and appliances;
barbershops and beauty salons; cleaners and laundries; pet stores; and nurseries. Offices may, in addition, be permitted to a group of four (4) stores or more without
additional parking, provided the offices do not exceed the equivalent of twenty percent (20%) of the gross floor area of the stores.
(2) Motels.
BOROUGH OF MOUNT EPHRAIM, N.J., CODE § 99-15B(1972) (emphasis added). The Borough's
zoning laws further provided that "[a]ll uses not expressly permitted in this chapter are prohibited." Id at § 99-4.
4. 101 S.Ct. at 2181.
5. The term "freedom of expression" is a generic one that collectively refers to rights of
free speech, free press, and communicative conduct. In Schad, the Court focused on the communicative conduct aspect of freedom of expression, but the reasoning applies equally to an
ordinance affecting rights of pure speech or press.
6. The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
7. The fourteenth amendment reads in pertinent part, "[N]or shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 2.
The Supreme Court has held that the rights guaranteed by the first amendment against
abridgement by the federal government are protected from abridgement by the states through
the operation of the fourteenth amendment due process clause. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 500 (1952); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940); Fiske v.
Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 387 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (dictum);
Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 332 (1920) (dictum).

tected expression,"' which the comprehensive zoning ordinance had
prohibited.
Since 1973, petitioners had operated an adult bookstore in the

Borough of Mount Ephraim. 9 In addition to selling a variety of
adult books, magazines, and films, petitioners procured amusement
licenses" ° to install coin-operated booths to exhibit adult films." In
July 1976, petitioners began to offer a second form of entertainment

in the booths. After inserting a coin, an opaque glass panel became
clear and patrons could view a nude dancer performing beyond the
panel.1 2 Consequently, complaints were filed against appellants for
violation of Mount Ephraim's zoning3 ordinance, which purportedly
prohibited live nude performances.'
Petitioners were convicted in municipal court of violating the

Mount Ephraim zoning ordinance and criminal fines were imposed.' 4 On appeal to the Camden County Court, defendants were
found guilty in a trial de novo. In an unreported opinion, Judge
Deighan stated, "[L]ive nude dancing is protected by the first
amendment but it is the opinion of this Court that the first amendment guarantees are not involved in this matter.""' The Appellate
Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey affirmed the convictions in a per curiam opinion essentially adopting the rationale of the
county court.' 6 After certification was denied by the New Jersey
Supreme Court,' 7 a petition for certiorari was granted by the United

States Supreme Court.' 8
Comprehensive zoning laws of the type involved in Schad 9
were first examined by the Supreme Court in Village ofEuclid v. Am8. 101 S. Ct. at 2182.
9. Id. at 2179.
10. In certain instances, a license or permit requirement may be an unconstitutional prior
restraint. See, e.g., Haynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1976); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 532-37 (1945); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306-07 (1940); Lovell
v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450-51 (1938). The Schad Court did not address this issue.
11. 101 S.Ct. at 2179.
12. Petition for Certiorari at 5, Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 101 S. Ct. 2176
(1981).
13. Petitioners were charged with violation of § 99-15B of the zoning ordinance, which
lists permitted uses in the commercial zone of Mount Ephraim. The ordinance does not mention live entertainment or live nude dancing as permitted uses. BOROUGH OF MOUNT
EPHRAIM, N.J., CODE § 99-15B (1972). Section 99-15B is reproduced in note 3 supra.
14. 101 S.Ct. at 2180, 2181.
15. Borough of Mount Ephraim v. Schad, No. 123-77, slip op. at - (Camden County Ct.,
N.J. Sept. 21, 1981) (unreported opinion), at'd, No. A-905-78 (N.J. Super. Ct. Dec. 17, 1979)
(unreported per curiam opinion), cert. denied, 82 N.J. 287, 412 A.2d 793 (1980), rev'd, 101 S.
Ct. 2176 (1981), reprinted in Petition for Certiorari, app. at 8a.
16. Borough of Mount Ephraim v. Schad, No. A-905-78 (N.J. Super. Ct. Dec. 17, 1979)
(unreported per curiam opinion), ceri. denied, 82 N.J. 287, 412 A.2d 793 (1980), rev'd, 101 S.
Ct. 2176 (1981).
17. Borough of Mount Ephraim v. Schad, 82 N.J. 287, 412 A.2d 793 (1980).
18. 101 S. Ct. 264 (1980).
19. See note 3 supra.

b/er Realty Co.,2 in which a zoning ordinance was upheld over a

challenge based on an alleged taking of property without just compensation.21 Under the Euclid approach, comprehensive zoning laws
designed to plan and limit municipal development are presumed
constitutional.22 With this recognition, the Court enunciated a stan-

dard against which it has measured all subsequent zoning
challenges.
The ordinance now under review, and all similar laws and regulations, must find their justification in some aspect of the police
power, asserted for the public welfare. The line which in this field
separates the legitimate from the illegitimate is not capable of precise delimitation. . . . If the validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative
judgment must be allowed to control.23

Supported by this strong presumption of constitutionality, municipalities responded with a proliferation of Euclid-type zoning ordinances, which permeated nearly every aspect of land use.24 Due to

this presumption, an individual challenging a zoning enactment
must scale a wall of deference to legislative judgment 25 and judi20. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). The zoning ordinance in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.
divided the village into six different districts based on the uses permitted within each district.
A seventh class of uses was totally banned. In addition to the use districts, the law established
three height-of-structure districts, four area-restriction districts, and other sundry regulations.
Id at 380-82. The different types of districts were intermingled, thereby providing fifty-two
possible classifications for each parcel of land in the village. Id at 382.
Euclid remains the seminal case in the field of zoning law.
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. is a remarkable decision because it treats so many
facets of the zoning problem. No lawyer should ever write a brief in a zoning case
without reviewing the Ambler ruling in search of something to quote. In spite of the
large number of different kinds of questions which can come up in a zoning case,
there will usually be something in the Ambler opinion which is relevant and
persuasive.
C. CRAWFORD, STRATEGY AND TACTICS IN MUNICIPAL ZONING 24-25 (2d ed. 1979).
21. 272 U.S. at 384.
22. Id. at 395-97; 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING §§ 3.14, 3.15 (2d ed.
1976). See generally Kolis, Citadels ofPrivilege: Exclusionary Land Use Regulations and the
Presumption of Constitutional Validity, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 585, 588-89 (1981).
23. 272 U.S. at 387-88. The Court adopted the rational basis test as the criterion for
determining the constitutional validity of zoning laws. "[I]t must be said before the ordinance
can be declared unconstitutional, that such provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable,
having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare." Id at
395. Accord, Netcow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928); Zahn v. Board of Pub.
Works, 274 U.S. 325, 328 (1927); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 608 (1927). Cf. Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 425 (1952);
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 1I, 31 (1905) (non-zoning contexts).
24. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. ch. 40:55[D] (West Supp. 1981) (empowering municipalities to exercise significant controls over diversified aspects of land use). See generally ALl
MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE (1976); J. ROSE, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAND USE

PLANNING (1st ed. 1979).
25. Courts are reluctant to invalidate decisions initially entrusted to legislative judgment.
See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954); Netcow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188
(1928); Zaln v. Board of Pub. Works, 274 U.S. 325, 328 (1927); Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387-88, 395 (1926). But f Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147,
161 (1939) (statute placed prior restraint on door-to-door canvassing; no deference to legislative decision). See generally Annot., 54 A.L.R. 1030 (1928); Annot., 86 A.L.R. 659 (1933);
Annot., 117 A.L.R. 1117 (1938).

cially hypothesized justifications2 6 before receiving relief. Although
broad latitude was given to the permissible scope of zoning ordinances, the Euclid Court was not presented with a conflict between
land use regulation and the exercise of a fundamental right.
The Supreme Court is often considered to be a special guardian
of essential liberties2 7 and has assumed this role on numerous occasions.2 8 The range of acceptable regulations, promulgated under the
aegis of the police power,29 is more closely circumscribed when the
regulations intrude upon fundamental rights.3" Moreover, in hold26. If the law in question is perceived to regulate only economic interests or other
nonfundamental interests, courts will often speculate concerning hypothetical reasons the legislature could have considered when promulgating the law. When these hypothesized justifications prove to be legitimate objects of governmental concern, the regulation will stand. See
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 152, 153 (1938). Moreover, the legislative determination is not required to be
precise since the law is valid if the legislative conclusion is fairly debatable. Minnesota v.
Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 101 S. Ct. 715, 723-24 (1981); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348
U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955).
Litigation concerning economic rights, as zoning laws generally do, evince the Court's
strict adherence to the position that due process only requires laws to be reasonable and not
arbitrary or capricious. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Williamson v. Lee
Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). Cf. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 101 S. Ct. 715,
724 (1981) (rational basis test applied to regulation of economic interests in equal protection
context).
27. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion)
(right to familial associations); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to personal autonomy
in abortion decisions); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (individual autonomy in
marital decisions); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex ret Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right to
procreate). But see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding incarceration
of persons of Japanese heritage during World War II).
James Madison made the following classic statement when the Bill of Rights was being
considered by Congress.
If they [the guarantees of the Bill of Rights] are incorporated into the Constitution, independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner
the guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulkwark against every
assumption of power in the Legislative or Executive; they will be naturally led to
resist every encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the Constitution by
the declaration of rights.
I Annals of Congress 439 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1789), quoted in Chapman v. Califomia, 386
U.S. 18, 21 n.4 (1967).
Furthermore, the incorporation of most of the Bill of Rights guarantees into the fourteenth amendment serves as ample evidence that the Court has surpassed even Madison's
expectations.
28. See note 27 supra.
29. The amorphous concept of police power has proved difficult to define. Perhaps Justice Holmes best expressed it in Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 111 (1911), when
he stated, "It may be said in a general way that the police power extends to all the great public
needs." Later, the Supreme Court in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954), opined, "Public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and order - these are some of the
more conspicuous examples of the traditional application of the police power to municipal
affairs. Yet they merely illustrate the scope of the power and do not delimit it." The Berman
explication was made in the context of a congressional exertion of the police power over Washington, D.C., but congressional power in this area is co-equal with the police power of a state.
District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., Inc., 346 U.S. 100, 108 (1953).
Although the scope of police power is broad, courts have long recognized that it may not
be invoked as a pretext to justify unreasonable or illegitimate government actions. E.g., Washington ex rel Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 121 (1928); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31 (1905); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887).
30. When fundamental rights are impinged upon by the operation of a regulation based

ings involving infringement of first amendment rights of freedom of
expression, the Supreme Court has permitted litigants to assert the
rights of individuals who were not before the Court.3 This "overbreadth doctrine ' 32 differs from third party standing, 3 3 but still re-

quires the jurisdictional showing of injury in fact. 34 Allowing the
use of this procedural anomaly 3" is intended to insure vitality in the
exchange of ideas, a vitality the Court perceives as essential to the
survival of democratic institutions.
Courts impose two related requirements on laws affecting freeon the police power, the Court's examination of the law is more critical and less deferential to
legislative judgment. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945). Even though laws may
be sustained under this less deferential standard, the Court will carefully balance the substantiality of the government's goal and the degree of impingement upon an individual's freedom.
See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977);
Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939). Compare Police Dep't. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) with Grayned v. City Of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (similar statutes
construed and different decisions reached due to impact on first amendment rights).
31. The practice of permitting litigants to assert nonparty rights in suits based on the first
amendment is referred to by the courts as the overbreadth doctrine. The principle served by
the doctrine is that statutes affecting first amendment rights of expression should be narrowly
drawn so that protected activity will not be stifled. E.g., Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for
a Better Environment, 100 S. Ct. 826, 834-35 (1980); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521
(1972); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 250 (1967).
Overbreadth challenges to laws allow a party affected by a statute to assert the rights of
expression of nonparty individuals regardless of whether his own activity is unprotected, since
freedom of expression is "the indispensable condition of nearly every form of freedom." Palko
v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937). Accord, Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a
Better Environment, 100 S.Ct. 826, 834-35 (1980); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.,
427 U.S. 50, 59 (1976). See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114-21 (1972); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK
ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 722 (1978). See generally Shaman, The First Amendment Rule
Against Overbreadth, 52 TEMP. L.Q. 259 (1979); Note, The FirstAmendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. REV. 844 (1970). See also Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 815-17 (1975).
32. See note 31 supra.
33. Third party standing, orjusterti also allows the litigant to rely on the rights of third
parties. Under this procedure, the challenging party asserts that the same instance of application of the law in question injures both the litigant and third parties not before the court. In
overbreadth challenges, however, the party before the court claims he has been injured by one
application of the statute and others may be injured by different applications. Note, Standing
to Assert ConstitutionalJus Terti, 88 HARV. L. REV. 423, 424 (1974). Overbreadth concerns a
court-adopted policy of protectionism of third party rights, whereas the foundations of thejus
tertii principle are (1)an inextricable bond between the rights of the challenger and the impaired rights of parties not before the court, and (2) some impairment of the third parties'
ability to defend their own rights. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114-16 (1976); Village
of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
For decisions addressing constitutionalpus tertil, see Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975)
(residents seeking to rely on non-residents' rights); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (doctor
seeking to assert patients' rights); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (doctor seeking
to assert rights of married couples to receive information concerning contraceptives); Barrows
v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (white landowner seeking to assert rights of blacks to equal
protection of the laws).
34. See, e.g., Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1971).
35. Since the individual may be allowed to assert overbreadth even if his conduct would
be unprotected by the first amendment, the doctrine is a departure from the general rule laid
down in United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960). In Raines, the Court maintained, "[O]ne
to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the
ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in
which its application might be unconstitutional." Id at 21.
36. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965); NAACP v. Button, 371

dom of expression. The boundaries created by these requirements
determine the permissible limits of interference with freedom of expression.3 7 Under this approach, a statute or ordinance must be narrowly drawn to serve legitimate police-power concerns without
creating a substantial chilling effect on protected communicative activity.38 Consequently, the court's inquiry focuses on the efficiency
of the particular means chosen by the lawmaker to achieve the regulation's goal.3 9 In addition, the court must determine whether the
legislative body could have accomplished its purpose by employing
an alternative regulatory scheme that is less intrusive on first amendment freedoms.4 ° Hence, under the less restrictive alternative analysis, the legislature may be required to use less intrusive means of

achieving its goal if the regulation resulted in an unacceptable impairment of rights.4 This two-pronged, means-focused review insures that "[p]recision of regulation [will] be the touchstone in an
area so closely touching our most precious freedoms."4 2 Ultimately,
for the statute to withstand judicial scrutiny, the tailoring of means
to ends must be precise.
The purpose or end sought to be furthered through a challenged
law will not escape scrutiny when fundamental interests4 3 are
threatened. Examination of the objective of the law begins with a
threshold determination whether that objective is a legitimate one.
In the case of state and local laws, legitimacy must be found within
the police power.' Moreover, the definition of police power has
proven elusive, since its exact scope depends upon the factual situaU.S. 417, 431 (1963); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945); Schneider v. New Jersey,
308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
37. See notes 38-42 and accompanying text infra.
38. Any first amendment activity that has no bearing on the problem the legislature attempted to correct must be excluded from the operation of the statute. See, e.g., NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel Flowers, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438
(1963); Louisiana ex rel Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293, 296-97 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
39. The means chosen must accurately separate regulable from non-regulable activity. If
an exact dividing line cannot be achieved, the court will insist that the imprecision work to the
detriment of the legislative purpose. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487-90 (1960).
40. See, e.g., Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 100 S.Ct. 826,
836-37 (1980); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 267-68 (1967); Martin v. City of Struthers,
319 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1943). Cf.Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 507-08 (1965)
(right to travel); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951) (state discrimination against interstate commerce). See generally Worth & Seldin, The Doctrine of the Reasonable Alternative, 9 UTAH L. REV. 254, 267-92 (1964).
41. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 709-10 (1931). Demands by the court that the statute be narrowly drawn
and that no less restrictive alternative exists to achieve the legislative purpose, force the statute
to have the least possible impact on first amendment rights. Allowing overbreadth challenges
facilitates the court's inquiry into whether these conditions for validity have been met.
42. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
43. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11,
31 (1905). See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). See also
note 27 supra.
44. See note 29 supra

tion encountered.

5

Assuming, arguendo, that legitimacy has been

established, the court will insist that the goal satisfy a substantiality
criterion. 6
The level of justification the end must reach depends on the
gravity of the interests affected.47 Interference with fundamental interests will heighten the court's scrutiny. Furthermore, protected
first amendment rights demand the highest level of scrutiny.4 8 Not
only must the state demonstrate the compelling nature of its goal, it
must also articulate its justifications without assistance from the
CoUrt. 4 9

The result is a balancing of individual rights against state
objectives on a case by case basis.50
Thus, Schad thrust the antinomy caused by the traditional def-

erence accorded zoning laws,5 1 especially those affecting only economic interests,5 2 and the fundamental rights analysis 53 squarely
before the Court.5 4 Preliminarily, the Court stated that the construc45. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). Compare Police
Dep't. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) with Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.
104 (1972) (similar statutes construed, but factual differences in scope determined outcome);
compare Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1942) with Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52
(1942) (prohibition of distribution of leaflets examined in both, but different impacts led to
different holdings).
46. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 403, 406, 408 (1963); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963); Schneider v. New
Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
47. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945). See California v. LaRue, 409 U.S.
109, 117 (1972).
48. In attempting to articulate the quality of the purpose that legislators must have been
attempting to achieve in order to prevail over freedom of expression, the Court has used a
variety of terms. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) ("important"); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) ("compelling"); Bates v. City of Little
Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960) ("cogent", "subordinating"); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 464 (1958) ("substantial"); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)
("paramount").
49. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977). See Metromedia, Inc. v.
San Diego, 101 S. Ct. 2882, 2895 (1981).
50. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536,
577 (1965) (Black, J., concurring); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126 (1959).
51. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926); I R. ANDERSON,
supra note 22, at §§ 3.14, 3.15; Kolis, supra note 22, at 586, 588-89.
52. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395-96 (1926). See Zahn v.
Board of Pub. Works, 274 U.S. 325, 327-28 (1927).
53. See note 30 supra. One commentator suggests that a challenge to a zoning law based
on first amendment proscriptions, when applied to the states and their political subdivisions
through the operation of the fourteenth amendment due process clause, should force the Court
to make three inquiries.
1. Is the objective sought a legitimate police power purpose within the purposes
specified in the enabling legislation?
2. Are the means utilized reasonably adapted to the accomplishment of this legitimate purpose?
3. Is the effect of the means employed unduly oppressive upon the challenger, or do
the means infringe a constitutionally protected interest of the challenger?
Kolis, supra note 22, at 589 (footnote omitted).
54. Justice White's majority opinion implicitly recognized this situation and determined
that the fundamental character of first amendment rights demanded the stricter standard of
review. Judicial review is much more difficult when fundamental interests, rather than fundamental rights, are the basis for the claim. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dep't. of Social Servs. of Dur-

tion of the ordinance by the New Jersey courts as one proscribing all
live entertainment, including nonobscene55 nude dancing, was binding for the purposes of the appeal.5 6 Nevertheless, the Schad Court

examined the borough ordinance and found it ambiguous and contradictory. 7 The case law relied on in the state courts was held not
to be controlling 8 and the scope of the opinion was limited to appellants' challenge alleging impingement upon first amendment
rights.5 9
Since the claim was based on the first amendment, appellants
were permitted to assert and rely on the rights of expression of others
in addition to their own commercial utilization of those rights. The
Court, motivated by fear that the wide sweep of the ordinance would
deter privileged activity, allowed appellants' overbreadth
challenge.6"
The Mount Ephraim zoning law was found to prohibit the exercise of numerous protected activities in the commercial zone. 6 ' The
Court determined that entertainment, including modes involving
nudity and dancing, constituted protected expressive activity.62 Beham County, 101 S. Ct. 2153 (1981) (interest in appointment of counsel in civil suit); Little v.
Streater, 101 S. Ct. 2202 (1981) (interest in state payment for blood test in paternity suit).
55. Whether an activity or publication is obscene is a question to be answered by the trier
of fact. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). If the dancing had been obscene, Schad
might easily have had a different result, since obscenity is not protected by the first amendment, Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481-85 (1957), and no right to purvey obscene
matter exists, United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 535-55 (1971).
56. See Gurley v. Holden, 421 U.S. 200, 208 (1975); United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971) (plurality opinion, but the applicable portion of the opinion
drew the concurrence of five Justices); American Oil Co. v. Neill, 380 U.S 451, 455-56 (1965).
If the construction by the New Jersey courts had not been binding in Schad, the Court might
have upheld the law by interpreting the ordinance as proscribing only obscene dancing. Because jurisdiction in Schad was, in part, based on 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1976), the ordinance
was treated as a state statute, see Erzoznick v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 207 n.3
(1975), and was required to comport with the fourteenth amendment.
57. The Court found contradictions to exist because, "[Section] 99-15[B] purports to
specify only the 'principal' permitted uses in commercial establishments, and its listing of retail
establishments is expressly non-exclusive; yet § 99-4 declares that all uses not expressly permitted are forbidden." 101 S. Ct. at 2182. See id at 2182 n.6. See also note 3 supra.
58. The state courts relied on Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976)
(plurality opinion). 101 S. Ct. at 2180. Reliance on Young was misplaced because the ordinance considered did not prohibit the expressive activity, but merely regulated it in a reasonable fashion. Id. at 2184. Furthermore, in Young, the municipality presented cogent and
substantial justifications for the regulation. Id
59. Excluded were petitioners' claims that the ordinance violated due process and equal
protection. 101 S. Ct. at 2181 n.4.
60. Id See notes 30-36 and accompanying text supra.
61. The zoning ordinance divided Mount Ephraim into three zones. Single-family dwellings were permitted in the first zone. In the second zone, real estate could be used for singlefamily dwellings, townhouses, and garden apartments. Commercial land uses were restricted
to the third zone and regulated by section 99-15 of the Borough code. 101 S. Ct. at 2179 n.1.
See note 3 supra.
62. 101 S. Ct. at 2181. Musicals, dramatic works, dance, and concerts were among the
protected activities that the ordinance prohibited. Id See generally Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (entertainment generally protected); Southeastern
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (protection afforded to the rock musical
"Hair"); Erzoznick v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (film involving nudity pro-

cause of the total ban on live entertainment, the majority found it
unnecessary to determine the exact measure of protection to be afforded nude dancing and other communicative conduct involving
nudity.6 3

While reaffirming that police power exercised through municipal zoning laws is broad and essential, the Schad Court recognized
that this power is limited. 64 The nature of the right asserted, not the
type of power the government exerted, controlled the applicable
standard of review.65 When the law affects only economic interests
in the use of land, the modest demand of rational relation to a legitimate government interest is the proper judicial yardstick of

constitutionality.66
Cases involving fundamental rights, however, present a different problem for courts and require more demanding analysis. Con-

sequently, municipal zoning ordinances "must further a [legitimate
and] sufficiently substantial government interest" 67 in order to be
sustained when they infringe on the essential freedom of expression. 68 Furthermore, the methods used must be well adapted to
achieve a substantial government interest. The Schad Court relied
on a standard imported from decisions concerning criminal law restraints on rights of expression. 69 Abridgement of freedom of expression cannot be justified by "'[mere legislative preferences or
beliefs respecting matters of public convenience.' "70 Courts following the Schad standard must insist on narrowly drawn statutes7 1 and
near congruence between the effects of the law and its goals.7 2 If the
tected); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975) (topless dancing by women protected);
Schact v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970) (dramatic play protected). But cf New York State
Liquor Auth. v. Bellanca, 101 S.Ct. 2599 (1981) (upholding ban on topless dancing by women
in establishments selling liquor).
63. 101 S.Ct. at 2181.
64. The Court explained, "The power of local governments to zone and control land is
undoubtedly broad and its proper exercise is an essential aspect of achieving a satisfactory
quality of life in both urban and rural communities. But the zoning power is not unchallengeable ... " Id at 2181.
65. Id See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308
U.S. 147, 161 (1939). Cf.United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), in
which Chief Justice Stone opined,
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the
Constitution, such as those of the first ten Amendments, which are deemed equally
specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.
66. 101 S.Ct. at 2181. Accord, Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104, 122-31 (1978); City of East Lake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 674 n.8
(1976); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592-93 (1962).
67. 101 S.Ct. at 2183.
68. Id at 2182-83. Cf.Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499-500 (1977)
(plurality opinion) (freedom of familial association); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S.
1, 18 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (freedom of association).
69. 101 S.Ct. at 2182-83 (relying on Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939)).
70. 101 S. Ct. at 2183 (quoting Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939)).
71. See notes 38-39 and accompanying text supra
72. See notes 40-42 and accompanying text supra.

legal isomorphism between goals and effects does not exist, the regulation will fall.73

In applying the first amendment formula for zoning laws, the
Schad Court was unable to discern a single compelling interest
among those advanced by the Borough.74 Although several of
Mount Ephraim's articulated goals7 5 rose to the level of legitimate
police power concerns,7 6 none implicated a state interest of sufficient

importance to justify such severe encroachment on the freedom of
expression. Therefore, the Court concluded that the proffered rationalizations for the ordinance were without merit7 7 because the Borough of Mount Ephraim transgressed constitutional limits on the
zoning power.7 8
Justice Blackmun filed a separate concurrence 7 9 in order to emphasize two points. First, whenever an exercise of zoning power
tramples on free expression, the traditional presumption of constitu-

tionality will not apply. Consequently, the easily satisfied demands
of bare rational relationship will be inoperative and the lawmaker
"must be prepared to articulate and support, a reasoned and signifi73. According to the Borough, the prohibition of live entertainment was necessary to
effectuate its development goals for the commercial zone. The purported purpose of the commercial zone was to supply only the immediate needs of the local residents. 101 S.Ct. at 218485. Without discussing the legitimacy of this pursuit, the majority found the position untenable in the face of the express objective of the zoning ordinance, which provides for "local and
regional commercial operations." BOROUGH OF MOUNT EPHRAIM, N.J., CODE § 99-15[A]
(1972) (emphasis added). The veracity of the Borough's assertion was further undermined by
the existence of several prior nonconforming uses offering live entertainment. 101 S. Ct. at
2185 & n.4. See generally I R. ANDERSON, supra note 22, at § 6.01-6.
74. 101 S. Ct. at 2184-87.
75. Legitimate areas of interest in which live entertainment was claimed to present difficulties for the borough included parking, police protection, medical facilities, and trash accumulation. Id. at 2184-87.
76. The legislature is not permitted to aggregate multiple legitimate objectives to satisfy
the requirement that the law serve a compelling interest. In order to satisfy the compelling
interest criterion, at least one of the legislative goals, independent of all other goals, must be
found compelling. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969). See notes 46-49 and
accompanying text supra.
77. The final attempt at justification consisted of arguing for validation of the ordinance
as a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction on live entertainment. See generally
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 63 & n.18 (1976); Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116-17 (1972); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 562-63 (1965). Although a regulation may constitute a reasonable time, place, and manner limitation on the
exercise of freedom of expression, it must not regulate on the basis of the ideas conveyed by
the expression, see Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937), and alternative
forums must be proved to exist, Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of New
York, 477 U.S. 530, 535 (1980); Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 85-87 (1949). The Borough failed to
produce any evidence evincing the existence of alternative outlets for petitioners' expressive
activity. 101 S.Ct. at 2187.
78. 101 S.Ct. at 2184-85.
79. Id at 2187-88. In a separate concurring opinion Justice Powell indicated that a more
narrowly drawn ordinance might have survived attack. Id at 2188. Concurring in the judgment, Justice Stevens eschewed the majority's overbreadth analysis and would have sustained
the convictions if content-neutral administration of the ordinance and adverse impact flowing
from petitioners' conduct had been proved. Id at 2188-91.

cant basis for its decision." 8

Second, political subdivisions of a state

may not justify exclusion of a form of expression on the grounds that
other municipalities permit that form of expression. 8 ' The effect of
Schad, according to Justice Blackmun, was to put municipalities on
notice "that where protected First Amendment interests are at stake,
zoning regulations have no such talismanic immunity from constitutional challenge."82
A dissenting opinion was offered by Chief Justice Burger, joined
by Justice Rehnquist.8 3 The Chief Justice would have affirmed the
convictions on the ground that the law was constitutional as applied,
since Mount Ephraim could prohibit nude dancing "[ejven assuming

that the 'expression' manifested in nude dancing is somehow protected under the First Amendment."84 The dissent accused the ma-

jority of "overconcern about draftsmanship and overbreadth"85 and
stated that invalidating an ordinance should be reserved for situations presenting interference with "genuine rights of expression."8 6
The Schad holding stands for the proposition that total prohibition of a form of protected expression will be difficult for a legislature to justify.8 7 Furthermore, the decision interprets speech to

encompass activity in which not a word is spoken88 and thereby indicates the Court's willingness to extend to expressive conduct the
same first and fourteenth amendment protection afforded pure
speech. Thus, Schad may portend a stronger constitutional shield

for expressive conduct and heightened judicial solicitude for the conveyance of ideas through unconventional modes of expression.

80. Id at 2187.
81. Justice Blackmun's concern was that allowing such a justification would leave Mount
Ephraim residents with their rights entrusted to political systems in which they had no voice.
Id at 2187-88. See note 77 supra
82. 101 S. Ct. at 2187.
83. Id at 2191-93.
84. Id at 2192.
85. Id
86. Id
87. Since Schad was decided, the Court has had two occasions to apply it. In the first
case that arguably implicated Schad, the Court predictably relied on the previous, controlling
decision in California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972), because state authority over alcoholic
beverages was addressed. New York State Liquor Auth. v. Bellanca, 101 S. Ct. 2599 (1981).
Both Bellanca and LaRue rest on the special grant of authority to the states over alcoholic
beverages made by the twenty-first amendment. The second case indicated that a plurality of
the Court views Schad as applicable only when a total prohibition of a particular type of
expression is involved. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 101 S. Ct. 2882, 2896 n.20
(1981) (plurality opinion). But see id at 2902-06 (Brennan, J., concurring).
88. See note 62 and accompanying text supra
[Casenote by Douglas R. Widin.]

